



DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
UNITED STATES ARMY TRIAL DEFENSE SERVICE
FORT BENNING FIELD OFFICE
FORT BENNING, GEORGIA 31906-6227

REPLY TO
ATTENTION OF

ATZB-JAD

22 June 2011

MEMORANDUM FOR Commander, US Army Forces Command, Fort McPherson, Georgia
30530.

SUBJECT: Appeal of the Administrative Reduction Board Results for SFC Paul D. Adkins
conducted on 23 May 2011.

1. I am submitting this appeal in response to the results of the Administrative Reduction Board for SFC Paul D. Adkins dated 23 May 2011. First, I respectfully do not agree with the findings of the board members and therefore respectfully request that you reinstate me back to the rank of Master Sergeant (E-8).
2. During 23 May 2011, the government held a reduction board hearing to determine if I was inefficient in my duties as a Master Sergeant for my handling of PFC Bradley Manning prior to the 10th Mountain Division's deployment to Iraq and while I supervised PFC Manning in Iraq. At that hearing, the government called five (5) witnesses to provide telephonic testimony about my duty performance while I supervised PFC Manning. Thus, with the exception of one witness (1LT Tanya Gaab), all witnesses indicated that I adequately performed my duties as a Master Sergeant and properly kept my chain of command informed while handling PFC Manning's multiple issues.
3. First, the government called SPC Jhirleah Showman as a telephonic witness. SPC Showman, immediate supervisor of PFC Manning for a period in Iraq, properly testified and stated that I had reservations about deploying PFC Manning into theatre and informed the chain of command about my concerns. SPC Showman also correctly stated that I informed MAJ Clifford Clausen, Brigade S2, about PFC Manning's disloyal statements prior to deployment. SPC Showman also properly indicated that I promptly removed PFC Manning from the SCIF after Manning assaulted her. Finally, SPC Showman stated that I did not usurp her authority as PFC Manning's immediate supervisor, and therefore she was allowed to make supervisory decisions.
4. Next, the government called CPT Steven Lim, Brigade S2, as a telephonic witness. CPT Lim stated that I had daily communication with him, and that I was performing multiple tasks as the NCOIC of the S2 section. CPT Lim also indicated that I was the only Soldier in the S2 shop that pulled swing shifts while in Iraq and that I often picked up the slack left behind from other Soldiers. Although CPT Lim testified that he believed I should have been a more assertive leader, he told the board members that I kept him and the command group informed about Soldier issues, and he believed that I was efficient in my duties as a Master Sergeant while supervising PFC Manning.
5. The government also called CW2 Joshua Ehresman, Intel Analyst Technician, as a witness. Similar to the aforementioned witnesses, CW2 Ehresman believed that I kept the chain of command informed about all Soldier issues and also believed that I kept him informed about PFC Manning's misconduct. CW2 Ehresman even stated that I would frequently talk to him about Soldier issues/problems because he was a former senior NCO and wanted to obtain his opinion about how to properly handle certain situations. Although CW2 Ehresman believed that I took a different approach towards Soldier problems than the approach he would have taken, he believed that I was efficient in my duties as a Master Sergeant while supervising PFC Manning.

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6. MSG (b) (6) HHC First Sergeant, was also called as a witness by the government at my reduction board hearing. As properly indicated by the first three (3) witnesses, MSG (b) (6) also stated that I frequently discussed Soldier issues/problems with him, and he believed I properly kept the chain of command informed about PFC Manning's behavior. MSG (b) (6) also stated that he was aware of PFC Manning's table throwing incident and aware that PFC Manning was attending behavior health counseling. MSG (b) (6) stated that he never believed that I purposefully held back any information about PFC Manning nor did I attempt to protect PFC Manning from receiving UCMJ punishment for his actions. MSG (b) (6) I was the Soldier who removed PFC Manning's clip from his weapon during one of his incidents and that because of my duty performance, he trusted me to be in charge of the enlisted soldiers within the S2 shop. Finally, MSG (b) (6) believed that I did not do anything that would have caused me to lose my rank.

7. Finally, during the administrative board reduction hearing, the government ended their direct examination of witnesses by calling 1LT Tanya Gaab as a telephonic witness. 1LT Gaab stated that she had minimum contact with PFC Manning and admitted she did not know everything that was going on within the S2 shop. 1LT Gaab testified that she informed the Company Commander and the First Sergeant about PFC Manning attacking SPC Showman shortly after the incident. 1LT Gaab stated that no one had yet briefed the Company Commander about PFC Manning's behavior, but she acknowledged that the First Sergeant indicated he already was aware of the situation. 1LT Gaab admitted that I was probably the Soldier who immediately notified the First Sergeant, which was indeed the case. It appeared that 1LT Gaab's primary concern was that PFC Manning possessed his weapon a few hours after attacking SPC Showman. However, 1LT Gaab did not realize that I already had removed the bolt from PFC Manning's weapon shortly after the incident occurred.

8. In addition to the aforementioned witness statements, I respectfully do not agree that I was inefficient in my duties and my supervision of PFC Manning. It appeared that the government placed a lot of weight on my continued referral to behavior health for PFC Manning. However, at that time, I honestly believed that the behavioral health professionals were the appropriate personnel to properly address PFC Manning's mental health concerns. I believed in the behavioral health professionals and Combat Stress Team because of the following reasons:

a. I believed the Army had been placing an enormous emphasis on its leaders not to stigmatize Soldiers and instead to assist their Soldiers in receiving mental health treatment and to avoid situations that may lead to suicide or other behaviors harmful to Soldiers. Therefore, after PFC Manning's outburst, I addressed concerns with leadership in the S-2 section, and I guided PFC Manning to seek the services of a behavioral health specialist. Therefore, in response to my concerns and supervision, PFC Manning went through a pre-screening examination at behavioral health and was diagnosed by a behavioral health specialist. However, the behavior health professionals did not have an ample opportunity to initiate the proper care and therapy because the 10th Mountain Division's deployment to Iraq was only about a month away from the date of PFC Manning's initial screening.

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h. It was my opinion from the lack of concern from the pre-screening by the behavioral health professionals that PFC Manning's issues were not serious enough to warrant on-going counseling from a behavioral health expert, or disqualify him from deploying on time with the unit. It was my understanding, at that time, that there simply was not enough time for the behavior health personnel to initiate long term therapy for PFC Manning and therefore his counseling would continue in theater.

9. The government also indicated they believed I was inefficient in my duties during the deployment of the 10th Mountain Division. However, I disagree with the government's assessment and believe that the decisions I made during that time were appropriate. Nevertheless, in hindsight, I understand other things could have been done to address PFC Manning's behavior problems. However, I do not believe that my supervision and leadership style should be deemed as inefficient for the following reasons:

a. While deployed, I ensured PFC Manning received proper therapy for his behavior. Thus, because of my recommendations and supervision, PFC Manning attended therapy sessions with the Combat Stress Teams shortly after arriving in Iraq, which was approximately November 2009. Next, MAJ Clausen, Brigade S2, and I wanted to ensure that there was a minimum risk associated with PFC Manning's behavior problems. Therefore, MAJ Clausen and I determined that the appropriate shift for PFC Manning to work with be the night shift to potentially reduce any stress that he may receive while working in the combat zone. During the course of the deployment, I also suggested to the Company Commander, MAJ Dreher, that the command should conduct a command referral for PFC Manning for mental health evaluation based upon PFC Manning's behavior. After receiving my recommendation, PFC Manning's command made a command referral for him to attend behavior health. Unfortunately, the personnel at the behavioral health department believed that PFC Manning was fit to return to duty. Nevertheless, I made sure that PFC Manning continued with his treatment at the behavioral health department until he was taken into custody around May of 2010.

b. I also wrote three memorandums for record, December 2009, March 2010 and April 2010 regarding PFC Manning's behavior. The three memorandums were addressed to PFC Manning's therapist, which described his behaviors and outburst. My intention of writing those memorandums was to ensure the therapist had a clear understanding of PFC Manning's behavior since I was not privy to their discussion and did not want PFC Manning to sugarcoat or fail to mention the incidents. I also wanted to ensure that the behavioral health specialists knew everything that I witnessed about PFC Manning so they could properly use that information towards their assessment of PFC Manning. Additionally, I met face-to-face, on a minimum of two occasions, to discuss PFC Manning's conditions with his therapist.

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10. In conclusion, I am respectfully requesting that you reinstate me back to the grade of Master Sergeant (E-8) because I do not believe I was inefficient in my duties while supervising PFC Bradley Manning. Additionally, based upon the testimonies from the aforementioned witnesses at the administrative reduction board, I do not believe the board members properly reviewed the evidence in my case when they made the recommendation to reduce me in rank. However, I believe that due to the high visibility of this case, the board members did not want to make any decisions that indicated anyone made "any" correct decisions while supervising/handling PFC Manning. Nevertheless, I believe that I was efficient in my duties and made appropriate decisions, given the circumstances, for PFC Manning. I have enclosed copies of my NCOERs during the deployment period in support of my assertion. Based upon the following, I am respectfully requesting for you to reinstate me back to my previous rank of Master Sergeant (E-8).

11. Point of contact for this memorandum is the undersigned at DSN (b) (6) or DSN (b) (6)

Encls


PAUL D. ADKINS
SFC, US ARMY